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Abstract
This study develops an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research
to analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of two patent instruments: (a) the patentabil-
ity of basic R&D, and (b) the division of prot between basic and applied researchers.
We nd that for the purpose of stimulating basic R&D and economic growth simul-
taneously, increasing the share of prot assigned to basic researchers is more e¤ective
than raising the patentability of basic R&D, which has either a negative e¤ect or an
inverted-U e¤ect on technological progress. However, a benevolent patent authority
requires both patent instruments to achieve the socially optimal allocation in the de-
centralized economy.
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"Our ambition to build a knowledge-based society and a European Research
Area requires a strong science base and high quality human capital. Basic re-
search is the answer to both demands. Todays fundamental research will turn
into tomorrows growth, competitiveness and better quality of life. The US has
understood this. The EU is still lagging behind. Ours is a wake-up call: we
need to act now to reverse this situation and ll the gap." European Research
Commissioner Philippe Busquin.1
1 Introduction
Basic (or fundamental) research is an important part of the innovation process by expanding
the frontier of human knowledge. However, unlike applied research, it may not lead to
immediate marketable applications; therefore, basic research is often underprovided and has
to be funded by the public sector.2 Given the importance of basic R&D, the European
Research Council was o¢ cially launched in 2007 as the rst European funding body to
support and promote fundamental research. An important policy lever for incentivizing
basic research is the patentability of basic R&D. For example, the European Union directive
on biotechnological patents (passed in 1998 and implemented by all of the 27 EU member
states by the end of 2006) has increased the patentability of biotechnological inventions in
Europe. This directive provides that "inventions ... shall be patentable even if they concern
a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which
biological material is produced, processed or used" and that "biological material which is
isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process may be the
subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature." In other words, biological
material could be patentable in Europe as a result of this directive. As for the US, in the
court case of Diamond vs. Chakrabarty of 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that genetically
modied organisms could be patentable.
Another important example of patentability of basic R&D is the Bayh-Dole Act (also
known as the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. As a result
of this Act, universities in the US are granted the right to patent and license the results
of federal government funded research. In a comprehensive review of the Bayh-Dole Act,
Mowery et al. (2004) argue that although this Act is one of the several key factors that
1European Research Commissions press release "Commission calls for a boost in basic research." January
15, 2004.
2See for example Akcigit et al. (2011) for an interesting quantitative analysis.
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contributed to the signicant increase in patenting and licensing of university inventions,
many of the historical contributions from universities to industrial innovation took place
without patenting. Furthermore, when universities patent their inventions, other researchers
are restricted from using these basic research outputs until the patents expire. Therefore,
Mowery et al. (2004) conclude that it is important for universities to recommit to the free
ow of knowledge that has historically enhanced industrial innovation. However, most OECD
countries currently give universities the right to patent their government-funded inventions
(OECD 2002).
In this study, we develop an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research to
analyze how the patentability of basic R&D a¤ects economic growth and social welfare. On
the one hand, we nd that raising the patentability of basic R&D increases patented basic
inventions that contribute to economic growth as the conventional argument suggests. On the
other hand, it reduces knowledge spillovers because more basic research outputs are patented
and become less accessible by other researchers. Given these opposing e¤ects, we nd that
patentability of basic R&D may have an inverted-U e¤ect on technological progress.3 The
intuition behind this non-monotonic e¤ect is based on the tradeo¤between patent protection
and knowledge spillovers. Putting it simply, raising the patentability of basic R&D increases
patented basic inventions that contribute to economic growth; however, this policy change
also decreases the accumulation of what we call pure knowledge,which is freely available to
all researchers. Our analysis reveals that these two opposite forces interact with each other
to potentially generate a non-monotonic relationship between patent protection for basic
inventions and technological progress. Furthermore, we nd that patentability of basic R&D
has a monotonically negative e¤ect on economic growth when knowledge spillovers depend
only on pure knowledge (but not on patented basic inventions). Intuitively, an increase
in the patentability of basic R&D generates a negative e¤ect on the accumulation of pure
knowledge as expected and an additional surprising negative crowding-out e¤ect on basic
R&D. This crowding-out e¤ect on basic R&D occurs because raising the patentability of basic
R&D increases the stock of industrially applicable basic inventions, which in turn improves
incentives for applied R&D by so much that basic R&D falls. Therefore, patentability of
basic R&D may not be an ideal policy instrument for stimulating basic research.
In addition to the patentability of basic R&D, we also consider a second related patent
3Recently, Qian (2007) and Lerner (2009) report empirical evidence that enhancing intellectual property
rights protection reduces innovation activities when the protection is already strong. This suggests that the
relationship between patent protection and innovation follows an inverted-U shape. See Furukawa (2010)
for a review on theoretical models. The present study di¤ers from previous theoretical studies by analyzing
a novel mechanism through knowledge spillovers of basic R&D that generate an inverted-U e¤ect of patent
rights on innovation.
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instrument that is the division of prot between basic and applied researchers. When an
applied researcher develops an invention based on a patented basic invention, she has to
pay a licensing fee to the patentholder of the basic invention. The prot-division rule in
the model captures this licensing arrangement in which the relative bargaining power of the
basic and applied researchers is inuenced by the relative strength of patent protection on
basic and applied inventions. Therefore, it is not unrealistic to treat the prot-division rule
as a patent policy lever. We show that unlike the patentability of basic R&D, the share of
prot assigned to basic researchers has a monotonically positive e¤ect on the equilibrium
growth rate. Intuitively, strengthening the bargaining power of basic researchers stimu-
lates basic R&D without stiing the spillover e¤ects of pure knowledge while increasing the
patentability of basic R&D reduces spillovers from pure knowledge. Therefore, strengthening
the bargaining power of basic researchers relative to applied researchers may be a superior
policy instrument for achieving the dual objectives of stimulating basic R&D and economic
growth. However, characterizing the optimal coordination of the two patent instruments,
we nd that a benevolent patent authority requires both patent instruments to achieve the
socially optimal allocation in the decentralized economy.
Our study relates to the R&D-based growth literature; see Romer (1990), Segerstrom
et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) for seminal
studies.4 This literature emphasizes two fundamental factors for endogenous technological
progress. First, the patent institution matters. Without su¢ cient patent protection, in-
vestors would have insu¢ cient incentives to invest resources in R&D activities due to the
public nature of knowledge. Another essence is the wide-spread spillover of knowledge, which
plays the critical role as a source of long-run economic growth. An inevitable tradeo¤emerges
between patent protection and knowledge spillovers. Patent protection encourages private
incentives for innovation but also limits the wide-spread use of patented inventions. This
latter e¤ect weakens knowledge spillovers from pure knowledge. Although patent protection
and knowledge spillovers are fundamental for long-run technological progress, there hasnt
been much analysis on their tradeo¤ in the context of an R&D-based growth model. We
ll this gap in the literature by explicitly analyzing this tradeo¤ in an endogenous growth
model with basic and applied R&D.
Our study also relates to the strand of literature on R&D-based growth models that
distinguish between basic and applied R&D; see Aghion and Howitt (1996) for a seminal
study. Subsequent studies by Michelacci (2003), Akiyama (2009) and Acs and Sanders
(2011) consider R&D and entrepreneurship as two types of innovative activities instead of
basic and applied R&D. Our variety-expanding model is also related to the quality-ladder
4See Jones (2005) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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model in Cozzi and Galli (2009, 2011), who consider basic and applied R&D as two stages of
innovation. A recent study by Akcigit et al. (2011) provides a quantitative analysis on the
underinvestment in basic R&D and policy implications of various types of R&D subsidies.
Our study complements these interesting studies by analyzing the growth and welfare e¤ects
of patentability of basic R&D and its optimal coordination with the prot-division rule.
Finally, our study relates to the literature on patent design for which Nordhaus (1969)
provides the seminal analysis on patent length. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehen-
sive review on the subsequent developments in this patent-design literature. While studies
in this literature are mostly based on a partial-equilibrium framework, our study follows
more closely a related macroeconomic literature by providing a dynamic general-equilibrium
(DGE) analysis on patent policy. In the macroeconomic literature on patent policy, the sem-
inal DGE analysis on patent length is Judd (1985), who shows that optimal patent length
can be innite.5 While these studies focus on patent length, a related branch of studies
analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of other patent instruments in R&D-based growth
models. See for example Li (2001) on patent breadth,6 Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi
(2006) on intellectual appropriability, ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) on forward patent
protection and patentability requirement, Kwan and Lai (2003), Horii and Iwaisako (2007)
and Furukawa (2007, 2010) on patent protection against imitation, Chu (2009) and Chu and
Pan (2011) on blocking patents, and Acs and Sanders (2011) on the division of prot between
entrepreneurs and inventors. A recent study by Acemoglu and Akcigit (2011) provides an
interesting analysis on optimal state-dependent patent protection based on the endogenous
technological gap between the leader and followers in an industry. The present paper com-
plements these studies by analyzing the optimal coordination of multiple patent instruments
in an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied R&D.7
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 analyzes the e¤ects of patent policies on economic growth and social welfare. The nal
section concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
5Subsequent studies by Horowitz and Lai (1996), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), Futagami and Iwaisako
(2007) and Chen and Iyigun (2011) show that optimal patent length is usually nite.
6See Chu (2010) for a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of patent breadth on income and consumption
inequality in addition to economic growth and also Chu (2011) for a quantitative analysis on uniform versus
sector-specic optimal patent breadth in a two-sector quality-ladder growth model.
7See also Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Palokangas (2011) on optimal patent length and breadth and
Chu and Furukawa (2011) on optimal patent breadth and prot division in research joint ventures. However,
these studies do not distinguish between basic and applied R&D.
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2 A simple R&D-based growth model with basic and
applied research
In this section, we extend the seminal R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990) and Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991) by introducing two types of innovative activities, namely basic R&D
and applied R&D. Our model builds on Akiyama (2009) by introducing patentability of basic
R&D and spillover e¤ects of pure knowledge. To model the patentability of basic R&D, we
assume that some basic research outputs are patentable while others are not. The probability
that a basic research output is patentable captures the degree of patentability of basic R&D.
A basic invention that is not patented becomes pure knowledge, which is freely available to
all researchers. An example would be the BlackScholes (1973) option-pricing formula (see
footnote 8 for a more detailed discussion). A patented basic invention might be matched
with an applied invention subject to a stochastic process. When this match occurs, the
matched inventions generate monopolistic prots. Applied researchers pay a licensing fee
to basic researchers by sharing prots subject to a prot-division rule. For simplicity, we
assume that patent length is innite as in the seminal Romer model.
2.1 The basic setup
Consider a continuous-time model, in which there is an innitely lived representative house-
hold. As in Aghion and Howitt (1996), the household inelastically supplies L units of un-
skilled labor and H units of skilled labor at each date t. Unskilled and skilled labors are
used for manufacturing and R&D respectively. The household is endowed with a standard
log utility function U =
R1
0
e t lnCtdt; where  > 0 is the discount rate and Ct is the
consumption of nal goods at date t: Final goods are used for consumption only. Given Ct
as the numeraire, standard dynamic optimization yields the familiar Euler equation given
by
:
Ct=Ct = rt   , where rt is the interest rate. Consumption goods are produced by a
standard CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregator over a continuum of patented
intermediate goods Xt(i) distributed on [0; Nt].
Ct =
Z Nt
0
Xt(i)
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
, (1)
where Nt is the number of intermediate goods (or industries) and " > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution. Consumption goods rms are perfectly competitive.
Each variety of intermediate goods is monopolistically manufactured by a monopolistic
producer who holds the patents on the manufacturing technology for intermediate goods
6
i: Each unit of intermediate goods is produced with one unit of unskilled labor; therefore,
the marginal cost is equal to the wage rate of unskilled labor wut . The monopolistic price
for patented intermediate goods i is equal to ["= ("  1)]wut . From prot maximization of
consumption goods rms, the conditional demand and prot functions of intermediate goods
are as follows.
Xt(i) =

"  1
"

Ct
wutNt
 Xt, t(i) = Ct
"Nt
 t. (2)
An industrial monopolist i holds the patents on the manufacturing technology of product i
and produces Xt(i) = Xt units of intermediate goods earning prot t(i) = t at each date
t. The value of being the monopolist in industry i is Vt(i) =
R1
t
e (R Rt)d  Vt, where
R =
R 
0
rsds is the cumulative interest rates up to date  .
2.2 Patented basic inventions and pure knowledge
The economy grows endogenously due to two forms of technological progress. The rst
growth engine is the accumulation of patented inventions. As mentioned above, an indus-
trial monopolist i holds a pair of well-matched basic and applied inventions. A basic invention
is a preliminary idea, which cannot bear any prot by itself but may establish the basis for
a future invention that generates prots by introducing a new variety of intermediate goods.
We call such a protable invention an applied invention. When an applied invention is de-
veloped on a patented basic invention that previously has not been matched, a new industry
is introduced into the intermediate goods market by the industrial monopolist holding the
pair of basic and applied inventions. This process of patented inventions continuously occurs
and contributes towards the variety Nt of intermediate goods in (1). The productivity of
consumption goods rms thus increases over time.
The second engine of technological progress is the accumulation of pure knowledge.
We introduce pure knowledge into the model as a by-product of basic research activity in
the following stylized manner. With our consideration on the patentability of basic R&D,
some basic inventions are randomly chosen to be patentable by the patent institution while
others are not patentable. Formally, each newly developed basic invention is patentable
with probability . An unpatented basic invention contributes to pure knowledge that is
freely available to all researchers, consequently having a knowledge spillover e¤ect on R&D
activity as in the knowledge-driven growth model of Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991). Here we assume that applied inventions must be derived from patented basic
inventions because any applied invention that is derived from public pure knowledge is not
patentable.
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Current research productivity depends on both patented basic inventions and pure knowl-
edge. Denote by Kt the cumulative number of unpatented basic inventions that have been
accumulated as of date t: This Kt represents the stock of pure knowledge in the economy at
date t. In this setting, we intend to di¤erentiate between pure knowledge and patented in-
ventions in their external spillover e¤ects. To do so, we assume that the knowledge spillover
e¤ect is a function of the stocks of pure knowledge and patented inventions, but these two
inputs are not perfectly substitutable.8 Furthermore, we consider two special cases in which
the spillover e¤ect depends only on either pure knowledge or patented basic inventions.
2.3 Basic and applied R&D
As mentioned above, the economy grows as the two factors of technological progress, Nt
and Kt, accumulate. The two factors increase as basic inventions are developed and then
industrially applied. In this section, we explain how inventions are made and applied to
industries and how inventions increase pure knowledge of the economy. There are innitely
many potential researchers. Potential researchers can make both basic and applied inven-
tions. Denote by Bt the cumulative number (stock) of total basic inventions. The stock of
basic inventions Bt increases due to basic research activity by researchers. The accumula-
tion of Bt gradually increases the two growth factors, Nt and Kt, through the three stages
of research to be described below.
2.3.1 Stage I (Patented basic inventions and pure knowledge)
When a potential researcher invests b=S (Kt; Bt  Kt) units of skilled labor in basic research,
she can develop a basic invention j without any risk of failure. In this setting, the spillover
function S(:) captures the extent to which the stocks of pure knowledge Kt and patented
basic inventions Bt   Kt a¤ect research productivity through knowledge spillovers. We
8It is useful to consider an alternative but related interpretation on . If we think of  as a technological
parameter instead of a policy instrument,  could be interpreted as the share of basic inventions that are
industrially applicable. These basic inventions are naturally granted a patent. The remaining share 1   
of basic inventions is pure research output, such as a mathematical theorem (e.g., the Black-Scholes option-
pricing formula) disseminated to other researchers through scientic journals. Under this interpretation, it is
natural that applied inventions are developed only on patented (i.e., industrially applicable) basic inventions
and that the stocks of pure knowledge and patented inventions are not perfectly substitutable. Also, we
can relate this interpretation to the patentability of basic R&D. Increasing the patentability of basic R&D
signicantly encourages patenting of university inventions (Mowery et al. 2004), resulting into an increase
in the share of industrially applicable basic inventions but potentially reducing research on pure knowledge.
Therefore, increasing the patentability of basic R&D can also be captured by an increase in  under this
alternative interpretation.
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adopt a simple Cobb-Douglas functional form for the spillover function S (Kt; Bt  Kt) =
K t (Bt  Kt)1  ,9 where  2 [0; 1] is a factor share parameter that controls how pure
knowledge Kt a¤ects the magnitude of knowledge spillovers.  2 f0; 1g captures the special
cases in which the spillover e¤ect depends only on either patented basic inventions Bt  Kt
or pure knowledge Kt.
Each newly developed basic invention is judged as patentable with probability  2 (0; 1),
and basic inventions that are not patented become pure knowledge. Thus, at date t, 
:
Bt
units of patentable basic inventions and (1   )
:
Bt units of pure knowledge are introduced.
We can describe the evolution of pure knowledge as
:
Kt = (1  )
:
Bt. (3)
Denote Zt as the market value of a basic invention that is patentable. Free entry guarantees
the following no-arbitrage condition in equilibrium.
Zt =
bwst
S (Kt; Bt  Kt) , (4)
where wst denotes the wage rate of skilled labor at date t.
2.3.2 Stage II (Basic inventions waiting for applied inventions)
Basic inventions that are patentable at date t, with size 
:
Bt; immediately go to a waiting
pool of patented inventions, where patented basic inventions (that have not been industrially
applied) await for applied inventions. Denote Wt as the pool of patented basic inventions
waiting for industrial applications. The inow to the waiting pool is 
:
Bt, and the outow is
the number of applied inventions
:
N t that are recently matched with basic inventions in the
waiting pool. Then, we have
:
W t = 
:
Bt  
:
N t. (5)
2.3.3 Stage III (Basic inventions becoming industrially applied)
We now turn to applied research activities. Applied researchers make applied inventions
that can be matched with basic inventions in the waiting pool. As a result of a successful
match, a new industry is introduced into the intermediate goods sector increasing Nt. When
9It is useful to note that our results are robust to generalizing the spillover function to a CES form. For
simplicity, we focus on the Cobb-Douglas spillover function in this study.
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an applied researcher invests ta=S (Kt; Bt  Kt) units of skilled labor in matching with
basic invention j, she can develop an applied invention that is well matched with the basic
invention with probability t. At the aggregate level, it holds that
:
N t = tWt. (6)
In other words, a fraction t of the waiting basic inventions Wt becomes industrially applied
at date t. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the three stages of innovation.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Once basic and applied inventions are matched, the patentholders of these inventions can
earn and share the nal market value Vt. This value Vt is shared between the patentholders
of basic and applied inventions according to a prot-division rule s 2 (0; 1). The applied
researcher takes (1  s)Vt and pays a licensing fee of sVt to the basic researcher. Then, we
can describe the free-entry condition to applied R&D as
(1  s)Vt = aw
s
t
S (Kt; Bt  Kt) . (7)
Recall that the patentholder of a basic invention takes sVt, earning a net value sVt   Zt.
Therefore, the market value Zt of a patented basic invention satises the following no-
arbitrage condition.
rtZt =
:
Zt + t (sVt   Zt) . (8)
The nal value of an invention Vt (i.e., the value of a pair of matched basic and applied
inventions) follows the familiar Bellman equation.
rtVt = t +
:
V t. (9)
Through the above three stages, basic and applied R&D governs technological progress
and economic growth. There are two roles of basic inventions in technological progress. One
is the role to increase the stock of pure knowledge Kt in the rst stage. The other is the
role to increase the number of industrially applicable basic inventions Wt and eventually
the variety of intermediate goods Nt. These two roles interact with each other to drive
technological progress and economic growth.
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2.4 Market equilibrium
The stock of total basic inventions Bt can be divided into three parts as follows.
Bt = Kt +Wt +Nt. (10)
This equation states that the stock of basic inventions Bt is divided into pure knowledge Kt,
patented basic inventions Wt that have not been industrially applied, and patented basic
inventions Nt that have been industrially applied. We now close the model by considering
the labor market equilibrium conditions.
L = NtXt (11)
for unskilled labor, and
1 = HA;t +HB;t =
a
:
N t
S (Kt; Bt  Kt) +
b
:
Bt
S (Kt; Bt  Kt) (12)
for skilled labor. Here we normalize the total supply of skilled labor to unity. The left-hand
side of (12) is the total supply of skilled labor and the right-hand side is the total demand
for skilled labor from applied research and basic research, respectively.
From (2)(12), we can completely characterize the equilibrium dynamics of our model.
Before proceeding, we dene a balanced growth path in our model. On the balanced growth
path, variables for cumulative inventions Bt, Kt, Nt, and Wt grow at a constant rate g,
which we call the equilibrium growth rate of technology, and the balanced growth rate of
consumption is equal to _Ct=Ct = gc = g
=("   1). Taking into account the laws of motion
(3), (5) and (6), we have the following steady-state ratios K=B = 1 , N=B = =(+g)
and W=B = g=( + g) on the balanced growth path. Using these ratios and (12), the
equilibrium growth rate of technology is
g =
:
Bt
Bt
= (1  ) ()1  

HB
b

, (13)
where HB 2 (0; 1) is the equilibrium amount of high-skill labor allocated to basic R&D.
Similarly, the equilibrium arrival rate  of applied inventions is
 =
_Nt
Wt
=
S (Kt; Bt  Kt) =Bt
Wt=Bt

HA
a

=

1  

 
 + g
g

HA
a

, (14)
where HA is the equilibrium amount of high-skill labor allocated to applied R&D.
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Equating (4) and (7) yields a no-arbitrage condition between basic and applied R&D
given by (1  s)Vt=a = Zt=b. Imposing the balanced growth condition on (8) yields Zt =
sVt
=( + r   gz), where r =  + gc from the Euler equation and gz = gc   g from (2).
Combining these two conditions yields
b
a

1  s
s

1

=

 + + g
. (15)
This condition along with 1 = HA + H

B, (13) and (14) solves the model. In the following
analysis, we restrict attention to the feasible region of  given by  2 (L; 1), where L 
(b=a) (1  s) =s. Given  > 0 and g > 0, the right hand side of (15) is less than one.
Therefore,  > L must hold in order for the left-hand side of (15) to be also less than one.
Finally, on the balanced growth path, the equilibrium growth rate g of technology is unique,
positive and determined by the following condition.10
(1  ) ()1  =b  g
+ g
=
 (1  s) g
sg +  (1  s) b=a . (16)
3 E¤ects of patent instruments
In the previous section, we have developed an R&D-based growth model with basic and
applied research. In this section, we investigate how the patentability of basic R&D and
the division of prot between basic and applied researchers a¤ect the growth rate g of
technology. Equation (16) is a quadratic equation for which the solution is quite complicated.
Here it is useful to rst consider a limiting case of g given by  approaching zero.
lim
!0
g = (1  ) ()1  
s
b

. (17)
This special case previews our results that the growth rate g is a strictly increasing function
in the share s of prot assigned to basic R&D and a potentially inverted-U function in
patentability . To be more precise, lim!0 g is an inverted-U function within the feasible
range of  if and only if 0 <  < 1   L. If   1   L, then lim!0 g would be a
monotonically decreasing function in  2 (L; 1). If  = 0, then lim!0 g would be a
monotonically increasing function in .
10We rule out the negative solution to (16) because g < 0 implies HB < 0 from (13). In an unpublished
appendix (see Appendix B), we provide an explicit solution for g > 0 and su¢ cient conditions under which
the economy converges to a locally stable balanced growth path.
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From the above expression, it may seem that the non-monotonic e¤ect of , which is
captured by (1  ) ()1  =b in (16), is entirely built-in through the spillover function
because lim!0HB = s is independent of . However, this is not true for the general case
of  > 0. In the case of  > 0, patentability  has two additional e¤ects on the growth rate
through the equilibrium allocation HB(s; ). There is a positive e¤ect of  on H

B, which
arises from the direct e¤ect of raising the patentability of basic inventions that increases
the incentives for basic R&D. This positive e¤ect of  on the growth rate g is captured by
sg in (16). There is a negative e¤ect of  on HB, which arises from an indirect e¤ect of
patentability  that increases applied R&D by so much to crowd out basic R&D through
the resource constraint on skilled labor. Intuitively, raising  may increase applied R&D HA
because a larger  increases the waiting pool of industrially applicable basic inventions. For
a given arrival rate of applied inventions, a larger waiting pool requires more applied R&D,
which in turn crowds out basic R&D, and this negative e¤ect of  on the growth rate g is
captured by  (1  s) g in (16). When the discount rate  approaches zero, this negative
crowding-out e¤ect and the positive incentive e¤ect cancel each other. When  is strictly
positive, the positive incentive e¤ect of  on the growth rate g is dominated by the negative
crowding-out e¤ect. Therefore, in the case of  > 0, it is the interaction between these
general-equilibrium e¤ects and the spillover function that drives our results.
We nd that patentability  has both positive and negative e¤ects on economic growth,
and this nding is consistent with the seminal result in ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004)
but the underlying mechanism is drastically di¤erent. ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004)
analyze the patentability requirement in a quality-ladder model. They show that increasing
the patentability requirement makes it harder to develop an innovation and reduces its
arrival rate, but the resulting larger step size of innovation also contributes to growth. In
our variety-expanding model with basic and applied research, patentability  of basic R&D
has four e¤ects on technological progress. First, it increases patented basic inventions by
raising the probability that a basic invention is patentable. Second, increasing patentability
 reduces knowledge spillovers from pure knowledge. Finally, increasing patentability  has
the positive incentive e¤ect and the negative crowding-out e¤ect on basic R&D.
The following proposition summarizes our rst key result, which demonstrates that the
e¤ect of raising the patentability  of basic R&D on the equilibrium growth rate g is
generally non-monotonic except when  is either su¢ ciently large or equal to zero. When  
is su¢ ciently large, g is monotonically decreasing in . In the unlikely case that the spillover
function is independent of pure knowledge (i.e.,  = 0), g is monotonically increasing in .
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Proposition 1 If   1   L, then g is monotonically decreasing in  for  2 (L; 1). If
0 <   s(1   L), then g is rstly increasing and eventually decreasing in ; therefore,
the relationship between g and  is non-monotonic. If s(1   L) <  < 1   L, then g is
either non-monotonic or strictly decreasing in  depending on the value of . If  = 0, then
g is monotonically increasing in .
Next we consider how the prot-division rule s a¤ects economic growth. We may interpret
an increase in s as a strengthening of patent protection for basic R&D relative to that of
applied R&D, so that applied researchers have to pay a larger amount of licensing fee to
basic researchers.11 The prot-division rule s controls the capital gain that is received by
basic researchers, sVt Zt, whereas the patentability parameter  a¤ects the initial expected
return on basic research, Zt. In summary, we nd that g continues to be monotonically
increasing in s when  > 0.
Proposition 2 The relationship between the prot share s of basic R&D and the technology
growth rate g is monotonically positive.
Proposition 2 shows that the growth rate is an increasing function in the prot share s
of basic research. Intuitively, the growth rate of Bt is determined by basic R&D HB, which
in turn is strictly increasing in s. Furthermore, on the balanced growth path, the growth
rate of Nt is equal to the growth rate of Bt. Although increasing s reduces the equilibrium
arrival rate  of applied inventions, this reduction in  does not a¤ect the growth rate but
only the steady-state ratio of N=B, which has a level e¤ect on social welfare as shown in the
next section. Therefore, strengthening patent protection for basic R&D relative to applied
R&D results in a faster growth rate. Because s < 1, there does not exist an interior growth-
maximizing prot-division rule. This result di¤ers from Cozzi and Galli (2011), who analyze
the division of prot between basic and applied researchers in a quality-ladder model. In
their model, the development of a quality improvement is based on the combination of a
basic invention and an applied invention. Therefore, in their quality-ladder model with basic
and applied R&D, Cozzi and Galli (2011) show an interesting result that an intermediate
value of s maximizes the arrival rate of innovation as well as the equilibrium growth rate.
In our variety-expanding model, basic R&D has a growth e¤ect while applied R&D has a
welfare e¤ect; therefore, the equilibrium growth rate is monotonically increasing in s.
11See also Cozzi and Galli (2011) for an interesting analysis of prot division between basic and applied
R&D on wage inequality and human-capital accumulation in a quality-ladder model.
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To summarize, the drastically di¤erent growth e¤ects of the two patent instruments
f; sg arise for the following reasons. Strengthening patent protection for basic R&D via
the prot-division rule stimulates basic R&D without stiing the spillover e¤ects of pure
knowledge. However, increasing the patentability of basic R&D eventually decreases basic
research due to a crowding-out e¤ect on skilled labor and also reduces the spillover e¤ect
from pure knowledge.
3.1 Optimal coordination of patent instruments
Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that the two patent instruments, the patentability  of basic R&D
and the prot-division rule s, are useful policy levers for controlling the equilibrium growth
rate in the decentralized economy. In this section, we demonstrate that the steady-state
welfare-maximizing allocation can be achieved in the decentralized economy only if both
patent instruments are present. Therefore, although the prot-division rule may be more
e¤ective than the patentability of basic R&D in stimulating basic research and technological
progress simultaneously, a benevolent patent authority requires both patent instruments to
achieve the socially optimal allocation.
Consider a social planners problem as follows.12
max
;HA;HB
U =
Z 1
0
e t lnCtdt
subject to the resource constraint HA +HB = 1, the laws of motion (3), (5), and (6) along
with _N = aHA=S (Kt; Bt  Kt) and _B = bHB=S (Kt; Bt  Kt). Imposing symmetry of Xt(i)
on (1) yields
Ct =
Z Nt
0
Xt(i)
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
= (Nt)
"
" 1Xt. (18)
The resource constraint for unskilled labor implies Xt = L=Nt, where L is the total supply
of unskilled labor. Therefore, (18) becomes Ct = (Nt)
1
" 1L. Taking log yields lnCt =
("  1) 1 lnNt + lnL, and the utility of households on the balanced growth path becomes
U =
1
("  1)

lnN0 +
g


, (19)
where the exogenous L has been dropped. The equilibrium growth rate of technology in
(13) and the equilibrium arrival rate of applied inventions in (14) hold along the balanced
12In the case of a social planner, it is more appropriate to view 1   as the fraction of basic inventions B
that the planner chooses as pure knowledge K.
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growth path for both the decentralized and centralized economies. Using (13) and (14), we
can re-express N=B as13
N
B
=
()1  (1  ) 
g

HA
a

=
b
a

HA
HB

 .
Substituting N=B and g into the utility of households (19) yields
("  1)U = ln

b
a
B0

+ ln

HA
HB

| {z }
=lnN0
+
(1  ) ()1  


HB
b

| {z }
=g=
, (20)
where B0 is the initial number of basic inventions. The resource constraint for high-skill
labor implies HA = 1   HB, and N=B   implies HB  b=(b + a).14 Then, we have the
following proposition characterizing the socially optimal allocation.
Proposition 3 The socially optimal ratio of pure knowledge to basic inventions is
1   =  , (21)
and the socially optimal amount of basic R&D is
HB =
1
2
 
1 +
s
1  4b
( ) (1   )1  
!
. (22)
Finally, by (13), the market equilibrium HB in the decentralized economy can be ex-
pressed as
HB(s; ) =
 
b
(1  ) ()1  
!
g(s; ), (23)
where the equilibrium growth rate g satises (16). To achieve the optimal allocation in the
decentralized equilibrium, a benevolent patent authority sets patentability  to its optimal
value  = 1  and the prot-division rule s to an intermediate value s that equates the
equilibriumHB to the optimalH

B . Intuitively, the patent instrument  achieves the optimal
ratio of pure knowledge to patented basic inventions whereas the patent instrument s achieves
the optimal ratio of basic R&D to applied R&D. Although the equilibrium growth rate is
13It is useful to recall the following steady state ratios (a) K=B = 1   , (b) N=B = =( + g), and
(c) W=B = g=( + g).
14When this constraint is violated, the arrival rate  of applied inventions becomes negative.
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monotonically increasing in s, the optimal prot-division rule s takes on an intermediate
value because applied R&D also contributes to social welfare through the initial level of
varieties N0. Proposition 4 summarizes this result.
Proposition 4 If  < 1 L, then the patent authority can achieve the steady-state welfare-
maximizing allocation in the decentralized economy by using the two patent instruments
f; sg. To do so, the patentability parameter  is set to its optimal level  = 1    ,
and the prot-division rule is set to an intermediate value s within the feasible range of s.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a simple R&D-based growth model with basic and ap-
plied research to analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of two patent instruments: (a) the
patentability of basic R&D, and (b) the division of prot between basic and applied re-
searchers. We nd that the patentability of basic R&D has either a monotonically negative
e¤ect or an inverted-U e¤ect on technological progress. Therefore, although increasing the
patentability of basic R&D may have contributed to economic growth since the 1980s with
continual technological progress on biotechnology and information technology, the inverted-U
relationship suggests that further increasing the patentability of basic R&D might eventu-
ally depress economic growth because increasing the patentability of basic R&D makes ba-
sic research discoveries less available to researchers resulting into a reduction in knowledge
spillovers. Furthermore, we nd that the equilibrium growth rate is monotonically increasing
in the share of prot assigned to basic researchers. Therefore, strengthening the bargaining
power of basic researchers relative to applied researchers may be a superior policy lever for
achieving the dual objectives of stimulating basic R&D and economic growth. However, for
a benevolent patent authority, both patent instruments are needed to achieve the socially
optimal allocation in the decentralized economy.
To keep our analysis tractable, we have considered a stylized model that may be extended
in the following ways. First, the patentability of basic R&D may be partially endogenized
by allowing basic researchers to inuence the industrial applicability of their inventions.
Second, the matching process may be generalized to allow basic inventors to also devote
resources towards successful matches. Finally, our model potentially features scale e¤ects,
which are removed by normalizing the supply of skilled labor to unity; see Jones (1999) and
Li (2000, 2002) for a fruitful discussion on scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models. It
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would be interesting to analyze the patent instruments in other vintages of scale-invariant
R&D-based growth models with basic and applied R&D. However, any of these extensions
would complicate our analysis signicantly, and hence, we leave them for future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: In (16), the left-hand side (LHS) is decreasing in g while the
right-hand side (RHS) is increasing in g. Furthermore, RHS is increasing in . Therefore,
if LHS is weakly decreasing in , then the equilibrium growth rate g must be decreasing
in . The condition for RHS to be weakly decreasing in  is   1   . In other words,
  1   L is a su¢ cient condition for g to be monotonically decreasing in  over the
parameter space of  2 (L; 1). Taking the total di¤erentials with respect to g and  in
(16) yields
dg
d
=
[g  [=(1 )]1  =b]=[2(g+)]+s(1 s)(g)2=[sg+(1 s)b=a]2
(1 s)2b=[a(sg+(1 s)b=a)2]+[=+(1= 1) =b]=(g+)2 .
As ! L = (b=a) (1  s) =s, g ! (1  s) [(a=b)s=(1  s)  1] =a. Therefore,
lim
!L
dg
d
=
[s (1 s)b=a  ][=(1 )]1  =[b2(g+)]+s(1 s)(g)2=[sg+(1 s)b=a]2
(1 s)2b=[a(sg+(1 s)b=a)2]+[=+(1= 1) =b]=(g+)2 > 0,
in which the inequality holds if   s   (1   s)b=a, which is equivalent to   s(1   L).
Furthermore, we know that so long as  > 0, lim!1 dg=d < 0. Therefore, g must be
a non-monotonic function in  if 0 <   s(1   L). As for s(1   L) <  < 1   L, we
know from (17) that lim!0 g is also non-monotonic in . However, when  > 0, g may be
strictly decreasing in  for s(1  L) <  < 1  L. Finally, if  = 0, then dg=d > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall that the LHS of (16) is decreasing in g while the
RHS is increasing in g. Furthermore, RHS is decreasing in s and LHS is independent of
s. Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate g must be increasing in s.
Proof of Proposition 3: Applying simple optimization on (20) yields the socially
optimal  = 1   and the socially optimal HB characterized by the following equation.
HB(1 HB) = b
( ) (1   )1  .
This quadratic equation has two solutions. Deriving the second-order condition, one can
easily show that the larger solution is the locally optimal HB , which is given in (22). To
ensure that this interior optimum is achievable, we naturally assume that HB > b=(b+a
),
which must hold given a su¢ ciently small . This parameter restriction simply implies that
atHB = HB , N=B < 
. To ensure that the locally optimalHB is also the global optimum,
we further impose U jHB=HB > U jHB=b=(b+a).15
15It can be shown that this equality must hold given a su¢ ciently small a.
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Proof of Proposition 4: First, set  to the optimal level  = 1  as implied by (21).
Then, we show that there exists a feasible value of s = s that equates the equilibriumHB to
the optimal HB . By (22), the optimal H

B 2 (0; 1) is independent of s while the equilibrium
HB is strictly increasing in s by Proposition 2. As s! 1, it can be shown by using (16) and
(23) that HB ! 1. Therefore, it su¢ ces to show that as s approaches its lower bound given
by b= (b+ a) (from  > L), H

B approaches a value that is below the optimal H

B . As
s! b=(b+ a), it can be shown by using (16) and (23) that HB ! b=(b+ a), which is
less than HB .
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Appendix B (not for publication)
In this appendix, we provide su¢ cient conditions under which the economy converges
to a locally stable balanced growth path (BGP). On the BGP, the equilibrium growth rate
g of technology is positive and determined by (16). By using the prot function in (2)
and the free-entry and non-arbitrage conditions in (4), (7), (8), and (9), and by dening
ct  Ct=("NtVt), kt  Kt=Bt, nt  Nt=Bt and ut  Wt=Bt, we obtain
t

as
b (1  s)   1

= ct. (24)
Claim 1 Note that  > (b=a)(1  s)=s must hold in order for t > 0, which gives rise to the
lower bound of  given by L  (b=a)(1  s)=s.
Since t = _Nt=Wt by (5),
_Nt
Nt
=
b (1  s)
as  b (1  s)
utct
nt
. (25)
By using the Euler equation,
_Ct
Ct
 
_Vt
Vt
= ct    (26)
is also derived. From (3),
_Kt
Kt
= (1  ) 1
kt
:
Bt
Bt
. (27)
From (6),
:
W t
Wt
=

ut
:
Bt
Bt
  nt
ut
_Nt
Nt
. (28)
From (2), (7), (12), and (25), noting the denition of the spillover function S(:),
:
Bt
Bt
=
k t (1  kt)1  
b
  a (1  s) ctut
as  b (1  s) . (29)
From (2), (7), and (11), the skill premium is given by
wst
wut
=
(1  s)L
a ("  1) k
 
t (1  kt)1  
1
ctnt
. (30)
From (24)(29), the equilibrium dynamical system of our model is given by
_ct
ct
= ct    
_Nt
Nt
, (31)
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_kt
kt
=

1  
kt
  1
 _Bt
Bt
, (32)
_nt
nt
=
b (1  s)
as  b (1  s)
utct
nt
 
_Bt
Bt
, (33)
and
_ut
ut
=


ut
  1
 :
Bt
Bt
  b (1  s)
as  b (1  s)ct, (34)
in which
:
Bt=Bt satises (29).
Firstly, steady states of the system are identied in what follows. In a BGP, all variables
grow at constant rates; specically, in our model, _Kt=Kt =
:
Bt=Bt =
:
W t=Wt = _Nt=Nt =
_Ct=Ct  _Vt=Vt holds. Denote by g the steady-state growth rate of variables Bt; Kt; Nt; and
Wt:
16 Denote the values of (ct; kt; nt; ut) along a BGP by (c; k; n; u):
The trivial BGP is excluded by assuming g > 0; which implies
k = 1  , (35)
in which the use has been made of
:
Kt=Kt =
:
Bt=Bt with (27). Noting
:
W t=Wt =
:
Bt=Bt with
(28), g > 0 also implies
n =   u. (36)
By _Ct=Ct   Vt=Vt = _Nt=Nt, equations (25) and (26) imply
u =
as  b (1  s)
b (1  s)

1  
c

n. (37)
Cancelling out n from (36) and (37),
u = 

as  b (1  s)
b (1  s)

1  
c
 
1 +
as  b (1  s)
b (1  s)

1  
c
 1
, (38)
and
n = 

1 +
as  b (1  s)
b (1  s)

1  
c
 1
. (39)
By _Nt=Nt = _Bt=Bt with (25) and (29),
(k) (1  k)1  
b
=
b (1  s)u
as  b (1  s)

c
n
+
a
b
c

. (40)
16From (1) and (11),
_Ct
Ct
= 1" 1g
, which implies _VtVt =

1
" 1   1

g.
25
Cancelling out c; k; and u from (40), with (35)(39) and g = c    by (26),
(1  ) ()1  =b  g
+ g
=
 (1  s) g
sg +  (1  s) b=a .
Because the left-hand side is a strictly decreasing function in g and the right-hand side is
a strictly increasing function in g, a unique positive BGP growth rate g exists. Because
g > 0 holds, c >  holds (1   =c > 0). This ensures the feasible values of the fractions
n and u: n 2 (0; 1) and u 2 (0; 1) hold by (38) and (39). The fraction of pure knowledge
k also satises k 2 (0; 1) by (35).
In what follows, the saddle-path stability of the dynamical system for (ct; kt; nt; ut) ; (31)
(34), is proved. From (32) and (35), since _Bt
Bt
> 0 by the assumption, _kt > 0 holds for all
kt < k
 and _kt < 0 holds for all kt > k: Thus, for any small  > 0; there exists a su¢ ciently
large T < 1 such that kt 2 (k   ; k + ) holds for all t  T: Due to the continuity of
the system, it would su¢ ce to analyze the stability of the 3 3 dynamical system omitting
_kt where k0 = k: We consider this abbreviated system omitting _kt: Using (35)(40), the
log-linearized version of this abbreviated system with (c^t; n^t; u^t) =
 
ln ct
c ; ln
nt
n ; ln
ut
u

has the
following coe¢ cient matrix, M :17
M =
0B@  g
  g
g +   g g + 
  b(1 s)
as b(1 s)
g+
g   b(1 s)(g
+)
as b(1 s) 0  asg
+b(1 s)
as b(1 s)    b(1 s)as b(1 s) g
+
g
1CA
where  = a
b
g(g+)
as
b(1 s)g
+
: We can show that the determinant of M is always positive.18 The
trace of M is negative if    asg+b(1 s)
as b(1 s) < 0 (a su¢ cient condition). This inequality can
be re-expressed as g > (1   2L=), where L  (b=a) (1  s) =s. Solving the quadratic
equation in (16) yields
g =
1
2
0@  +
s
2 + 4

1  

 
(1  s) 
a
1A ,
17We can formally prove that the coe¢ cient matrx for the original 4 4 linearized system (including _kt)
has the three same eigenvalues as those of the coe¢ cient matrix for the abbreviated 3 3 linearized system
(omitting _kt with kt = k). We can also show that the remaining one eigenvalue is a multiple root that is
equal to  g; which is negative. Therefore, since kt is a non-jumpable variable, it su¢ ces to verify only the
stability of the abbreviated 3 3 system in our model.
18Note that the determinant of M is equal to
b (1  s)    (g + ) + (g)2 + 2g+ as(g)2 (g + + ) :
26
where    (1  s) [1 + b=(a)]   (1  ) ()1  s=b is a composite parameter. Using this
expression, we nd that g > (1  2L=) can be re-expressed as
s (1  ) ()1  
(2  s) b > (1  2L=).
When this inequality holds, the eigenvalues ofM , denoted by 1; 2; and 3, satisfy 123 >
0 and 1 + 2 + 3 < 0. This implies that M has two negative and one positive eigenvalues,
which proves the saddle-path stability of the system.
Claim 2 If  is su¢ ciently small (or  < 2L), then the dynamical system is locally saddle-
path stable.
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